# High-Assurance Agent Control Envelope HAACE

[3 · Permit](/category/permit/)
Candidate · auto-drafted, unreviewed · confidence 80%

| High-Assurance Agent Control Envelope |
| --- |
| Category | [Permit](/category/permit/) |
| Governed by | Individual Internet-Draft by a single author, submitted to the IETF Network Working Group; not adopted by a working group |
| Status | Internet-Draft, Intended Status: Informational; expires 17 April 2027 |
| Phase | draft |
| Implementation | unknown |
| Adoption | unmeasured |
| Version | draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope-00 (2026-10-14) |
| Specification | [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope-00](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope-00) |
| Found at | No discovery mechanism defined; the relying party declares an Assurance Requirement Profile (ARP) out of band |
| Last checked | 2026-10-19 |
| Freshness | current · checked 2026-10-19 |
| Solves | Audit what an agent did, Delegate a user's authority to an agent, Let agents act on my website |

High-Assurance Agent Control Envelope (HAACE) is an agentic-web standard (document format) at step 3, Permit, governed by Individual Internet-Draft by a single author, submitted to the IETF Network Working Group; its own status is "Internet-Draft, Intended Status: Informational; expires 17 April 2027" (draft). It answers: How can a relying party gate an exact agent action at execution time so that missing, stale, or indeterminate identity, authorization, evidence, revocation, or human-approval prerequisites fail closed? Adoption is unmeasured, last verified 2026-10-19.

[Permit](/category/permit/) HAACE is an individual Internet-Draft (Informational) defining a protocol-neutral execution-gate profile for agent actions. A relying party declares an Assurance Requirement Profile; an Action Control Point evaluates an Action Request Record and emits a non-bearer Action Decision Receipt, followed by a separate Action Execution Receipt if an effect is attempted. Missing or indeterminate required premises must not produce ALLOW. It composes with OAuth, workload identity, attestation and transparency mechanisms rather than replacing them.

## Discovery and probe

No discovery mechanism defined; the relying party declares an Assurance Requirement Profile (ARP) out of band

```
NONE
parse:
on absent: Support cannot be observed externally; HAACE is an internal action-time enforcement profile with no public endpoint.
```

Not probed live: no-fixed-path. candidate record; probe rule pending

## History
- 2026-10-19 — auto-drafted candidate from exa (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope-00)

## Instances

No instances recorded yet.

## See also

## References

- The Internet-Draft defines HAACE, a protocol-neutral profile binding an exact agent action to identity status, authorization state, policy, assurance stage, evidence state, authority epoch, revocation state and oversight requirements, with fail-closed handling and non-bearer decision and execution receipts. — [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope-00](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope-00) (2026-10-14) REPORTED

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